Three experiments examined the effects of a perpetrator group member expressing various emotions or no emotion on victim group members' propensity to forgive the perpetrator group and hold positive outgroup beliefs. All studies were conducted in Bosnia Herzegovina. In Study 1 (N ϭ 112), a member of the Serbian outgroup expressed no emotion, image shame, moral shame, or guilt while talking about her group's involvement in a recent atrocity (Srebrenica). The first condition elicited more forgiveness and more favorable outgroup cognitions in comparison with the other three conditions. This effect was replicated in Studies 2 (N ϭ 90) and 3 (N ϭ 98), which also incorporated manipulations of apologies and reparations respectively. Apologies had no effect on intergroup forgiveness or positive outgroup cognitions; reparations had more positive effects irrespective of emotions expressed.
Apologies
The literature on the effectiveness of apologies in helping to rectify a wrong and to promote forgiveness from the wronged party paints a confusing picture. Everyday intuition would suggest that after committing an egregious offense, the first, though not necessarily sufficient, step must be for the perpetrator to apologize to the victim. Research on interpersonal relationships largely supports this intuition since it has usually been found that apologies lead to a more forgiving response (e.g., Exline & Baumeister, 2000; McCullough et al., 1998) .
In intergroup contexts the evidence is less clear-cut. Historical analyses of official apologies suggest that the form in which they are to be given is often vigorously contested and they do not always lead straightforwardly to intergroup reconciliation (Barkan, 2000; Blatz, Schumann, & Ross, 2009; Nobles, 2008; Wohl, Hornsey, & Philpot, 2011) . There are many reasons underlying the equivocal effects of intergroup apologies: they may be attributionally ambiguous-is the apology a sincere acknowledgment of the perpetrator's responsibility for the malfeasance or merely a cynical reputation saving ploy? (Blatz et al., 2009; Wohl et al., 2011) ; the apology, however sincerely made, may not adequately address the victim group's needs for (re)empowerment (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008) ; apologies may simply be perceived as insufficient to right the wrongs experienced by the victim group, either because they are seen as 'empty gestures' or because they fail adequately to rectify current inequalities or injustices (Wohl et al., 2011) ; apologies may also be seen as a strategy by the harmdoer to shift the reconciliation burden away from the perpetrator group onto the victim group as a way of turning the page on history (Zaiser & Giner-Sorolla, 2013) . For any or all of these reasons, apologies made by or on behalf of perpetrator groups may not result in a reconciliatory gesture from victim groups.
Social psychological research on intergroup apologies certainly bears out this equivocal conclusion. Brown, Wohl, and Exline (2008) found that an outgroup representative's apology to the victims of his country's 'friendly fire' incident reduced feelings of revenge and avoidance among members of the victim group, especially (but not exclusively) for less strongly identified members of that group. Nadler and Liviatan (2006) observed that an outgroup leader's statement of responsibility and empathy for the victim group (if not an actual apology) led to increased tendencies toward reconciliation, so long as there were sufficient levels of outgroup trust. Leonard, Mackie, and Smith (2011) found that students were more forgiving of their professors as a group when they (the professors) apologized for a public criticism of student subculture than if they refused to apologize.
On the other hand, across four studies, Philpot and Hornsey (2008) found that the presence of an apology from the perpetrator outgroup had no reliable effects on members of the victim group's tendency to forgive that outgroup (see also Kirchhoff & Č ehajić-Clancy, 2014) , although they did pronounce themselves more satisfied and perceived the perpetrator as experiencing more remorse when an apology was given than when it was not. Nevertheless, even these positive reactions were somewhat undermined by an enhanced perception that the perpetrator was acting out of "ulterior motives" in making an apology. It should be noted that the "apology" manipulation used by Philpot and Hornsey (2008) was a compound one-in addition to an apology, it also contained emotional expressions of remorse, statements of responsibility, and offers of reparation (p. 477). In the final study of this series, the effects of enhancing the expression of emotions ("deep remorse," "regret," "sorrow" and "grief," p. 483) were examined (Philpot & Hornsey, 2008, Study 4) . If anything, this more emotive apology inhibited forgiveness as compared with the standard apology condition. We return to the role of emotions shortly. Wohl, Hornsey, and Bennett (2012, Study 3 ) also examined the effects of apologies laced with emotions, as compared with a no-apology control condition. In this instance, the emotions expressed by the outgroup perpetrator were either "primary," such as rage and sadness, or "secondary," such as repulsion and griefemotions to be perceived as uniquely human (Leyens et al., 2000) . An outgroup apology accompanied by primary emotions led to enhanced forgiveness compared with both the (no apology) control condition and the apology with secondary emotions; the latter two conditions did not differ. Wohl et al. (2011) explored the effects of primary versus secondary emotions on forgiveness in other studies, discussed below.
In summary, then, experimental studies of group apologies have used a variety of apology manipulations, some with multiple elements, and the effects on intergroup forgiveness have been mixed. Further clarification would seem to be in order. In this work we examine the effects of apology offers (vs. explicit apology refusal) accompanied (or not) by different emotion expressions. We opted for explicit apology and reparation refusals to avoid wrongful implicit attribution to perpetrator group member responses. Given that all four emotion conditions included a clear and an explicit acknowledgment of ingroup responsibility, by including explicit offers versus refusals of apologies or reparations, we avoid the risk of wrong assumptions such as implying apology or reparation endorsement even if they are not explicitly endorsed.
Reparations
Research on the effects of offering or making reparations after a misdeed presents a more consistent story. Zechmeister, Garcia, Romero, and Vas (2004) found that an apology offered in an interpersonal offense context somewhat increased forgiveness if it also included an attempt to rectify the mistake, but significantly decreased it (compared with a neutral control condition) if it did not. Giner-Sorolla, Castano, Espinosa, and Brown (2008; Study 2) found that people were less insulted by an outgroup perpetrator who offered to make reparations for his company's negligence than by one who made no such offer. In the former condition, the degree of insult was qualified by the emotion which he appeared to feel while offering reparation: least insult was felt when he expressed shame, compared with a guilt or no-emotion condition. In a subsequent study, Giner-Sorolla, Kamau, and Castano (2010) found that Black British participants felt less insulted if made an apology together with an offer of compensation by a senior police officer in relation to ethnic bias in police "stop and searches," than if no apology or compensation was offered. This effect was moderated by the degree of blame attributed to the police and by the emotions apparently expressed by the spokesperson (somewhat less insult felt under high blame and shame).
It seems, therefore, that the effects of making reparations in intergroup contexts are generally to promote somewhat more conThis document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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ciliatory responses from the wronged group, although the literature is sparse and the effects on intergroup forgiveness itself have not yet been studied.
Accompanying Emotions
As we noted in our opening remarks, official apologies for ingroup wrong-doings, whether or not they also contain offers of reparation, are often accompanied by various expressions of emotion. Spokespersons for perpetrator groups have been known to declare themselves feeling concern, contrition, guilt, regret, remorse, sadness, shame, and sorrow, among other emotions (Brooks, 1999; Lazare, 2004; Nobles, 2008) . This raises an interesting theoretical and practical question: what are the effects of such expressions of emotions on the victim group's readiness to forgive the perpetrator group and to make steps toward intergroup reconciliation? There are two contrasting perspectives that offer the promise of answers to this question.
On one hand, it could be argued that if perpetrators express certain kinds of emotions while making or offering apologies or reparations, they may be seen by victim group members as more "human" and less "bestial" or "mechanistic" (Haslam, 2006) . "Secondary" emotions (like guilt and shame), in particular, might have such effects because the ability to express them tends to be seen as being uniquely the property of the human species, in contrast to "primary" emotions which are seen as shared with nonhuman animals also (Leyens et al., 2000) . Thus, it could be argued, perpetrator group members who express guilt or shame, as in the case of Cardinal Brady described earlier, will elicit a more favorable reaction from their victims, and hence higher levels of forgiveness.
Evidence for this first theoretical account of the role of expressed emotions in promoting intergroup forgiveness is sparse. As noted earlier, Giner-Sorolla et al. (2008) , using a vignette paradigm, found some evidence that people felt less insulted by a director of a negligent company responsible for environmental pollution if he expressed shame rather than guilt (or no emotion), although the differential effects of emotion disappeared if he failed to make any offers of reparation (see also, Giner-Sorolla et al., 2010) . A limitation of this work is that the "victim group" status of the research participants was ambiguous; it was not clear that they would have been affected as a group by the industrial disaster described in the hypothetical scenario. In a more realistic follow-up study, Kenyan participants who were asked to imagine an official apology from the British Government for the effects of colonialism felt that the two countries would be marginally closer if that apology included shame rather than guilt (Kamau, GinerSorolla, & Zebel, 2013) . None of these studies measured intergroup forgiveness and neither did they distinguish between the two variants of shame.
Some recent research offers a more nuanced view of groupbased shame however (Allpress, Barlow, Brown, & Winnifred, 2010; Allpress, Brown, Giner-Sorolla, Deonna, & Teroni, 2014; Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2012) . In this work, it has been found useful to distinguish between shame which derives from an appraisal that the ingroup is morally flawed in some respect, what some have called "moral shame," and shame which stems from a sense that the group is viewed negatively by others, sometimes called "image shame" (Allpress et al., 2014; Rees et al., 2013) . These different varieties of shame or shame-like emotions, when expressed by members of perpetrator groups, have been found to have very different correlates: typically, "moral shame" has been found to be associated with prosocial tendencies, whereas "image shame" (or its equivalent) seems to be linked to less positive orientations like withdrawal or cover-up (Allpress et al., 2010 (Allpress et al., , 2014 Gausel et al., 2012; Rees et al., 2013) . By implication, then, perpetrator groups who express "moral shame" should be more favorably viewed than those who express "image shame" because, in the latter case, the expressed emotion may be seen by victim groups as a cynical form of reputation management.
Guilt, on the other hand, arises mainly from perceptions of ingroup responsibility over past misdeeds and thus tends to generate tendencies to repair the damage caused to the outgroup (e.g., Branscombe et al., 2004) , partially as a result of feelings of empathy for the outgroup . Consequently, it could be argued that expressions of guilt, as with expressions of moral shame, might also be favorably viewed by victim group members.
Despite moderate positive correlations between both types of shame and guilt emotion, it needs to be noted that the key difference between these moral emotions lies in the focus of the situation interpretation (appraisal). An interpretation that is more associated with damaged reputation is likely to give rise to image shame; an interpretation that focuses on the potentially flawed essence of the group is more associated with moral shame; and an interpretation that is directed toward the consequences of the wrongdoing (for the those who have been harmed) is more likely to elicit guilt (e.g., .
A second point of view on the effects of expressed emotions accompanying collective apologies has been articulated by Wohl et al. (2011) . Starting from the well-established infrahumanization phenomenon-the tendency for outgroups to be seen as less capable of feeling secondary emotions than ingroups, and hence to be seen as less human (Leyens et al., 2000; Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003)-Wohl and colleagues (2011) argue that, if apologies from an outgroup contains "secondary" emotions, they will be regarded as unconvincing because they are inconsistent with the "default" infrahumanization perception. Across five studies Wohl and colleagues (2011) provide evidence that expressing some secondary emotions while apologizing seems to depress forgiveness from the victim group, as compared with expressing primary emotions or none at all.
In this research, we set out to explore further the validity of these two accounts of the potential effects that emotional expression may have when accompanying apologies or reparations for group misdeeds through teasing apart specific emotion expressions. We did so in the postconflict setting of BiH, a country that was blighted by a prolonged and violent conflict in the 1990s, resulting in the deaths of an estimated 100,000 people, the destruction or "ethnic cleansing" of many communities, and the displacement of more than a million refugees (ICTY, http://www.icty.org/ sid/10622). Nearly 20 years later, the country is still fissured along ethnic lines. After the Dayton Agreement of 1995, BiH was divided into two "entities," Republic of Srpska and the BosniakCroat Federation, under the overall jurisdiction of an Office of High Commission. In contrast to the situation in former Yugoslavia (up until the early 1990s), there is now little political, residential, or educational integration between the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) and This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Serb communities. The annual July memorial day for the Srebrenica genocide still sometimes elicits pro-Serbian demonstrations (http:// www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/07/bosnia-rememberingsrebrenicamassacre-201471583512715776.html). Even though the former president of Serbia, Tomislav Nikolić, recently apologized for the crimes committed in Srebrenica, the general public sentiment in Republic of Srpska (RS) is still characterized by denial and self-victimization following the public repeated statements of denial by the president of the RS, Milorad Dodik. Given that the context in which we set our studies is still marked by low levels of intergroup trust (Č ehajić, and high levels of denial (Č ehajić et al., 2008) , using a group apology (expressed on behalf of an official group representative-real or perceived) would have not been viable or experimentally successful. Therefore, we opted for a more realistic and hence potentially successful scenario of using a highly identified group member offering an apology (or not). Against this back-drop, we investigated factors that might lead to (or inhibit) forgiveness among Bosniak late adolescents. Although they were too young to have been directly involved in the conflict, such is its contemporary societal salience that it is still very much a live issue in their lives. The rationale behind choosing intergroup forgiveness as the main dependent measure is that many authors view forgiveness is as an important ingredient and indicator of sustainable reconciliation (Č ehajić-Clancy & Bilewicz, 2017; Č ehajić et al., 2008; Tutu, 1999) . Consistent with the conceptualization of interpersonal forgiveness (e.g., McCullough, Fincham, & Tsang, 2003) , intergroup forgiveness involves a reduction of negative emotions, such as anger, toward the perpetrator group and intentions to understand, approach, and engage with its members. Such an engagement with the previous "enemy" ultimately leads to more positive intergroup relations (Lederach, 1997). Our chosen methodology, involving a short professionally scripted and directed stimulus film of a young Serbian woman talking about the war (in different ways, according to experimental condition), thus has more realism and immediacy than some other recent investigations into the effects of apology, reparation, and accompanying emotions; these have typically relied on written descriptions of perpetrator actions and emotions which have often failed to manipulate peoples' perceptions on socially salient and emotional topics when using nonstudent samples. The Serb protagonist in the film spoke about atrocities committed by Serbs during the war and as a Serb acknowledged responsibility for them in all experimental conditions. To manipulate emotional expressions successfully, in addition to hiring a professional script writer and a film director, a professional actress has been hired. Then, depending on condition, she explicitly expressed Image Shame (e.g., "I am ashamed because of the way the world looks at us now," Moral Shame ("Very often I feel ashamed for being a Serb," Guilt ("Sometimes when I think what my group has done, feelings of guilt override me"), or No Emotion ("I don't feel much. I do not see a point in feelings") for her group's actions. As a professional actress following carefully developed and written scripts, she has also enacted each emotion nonverbally as well. However, it must be noted that each emotion condition contained explicit expressions of feeling ashamed, guilty and so forth depending on the condition. We also varied whether or not reparations or apologies were offered. This paradigm allowed us to examine the two competing perspectives in relation to emotion expression effects:
H1: The expression of secondary emotions (such as moral shame and guilt) would elicit more forgiveness from victim group members than expressing no emotion.
H2:
The expression of secondary emotions would elicit less forgiveness from the victim group than expressing no emotion.
Study 1
In this first study we sought to examine the effects of acknowledgment accompanied by different emotional expressions in the absence of either an apology or reparations.
Method
Participants. One hundred twelve Bosniak high school students (46 males, 66 females; mean age ϭ 15.98 years, SD ϭ 1.08) in Sarajevo participated in this study. All data were collected in one high school. They were randomly assigned to four experimental conditions: no emotion (N ϭ 30), image shame (N ϭ 25), moral shame (N ϭ 29), and guilt (N ϭ 28).
Procedure. Participants were informed that they were participating in a study examining intergroup relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Data were collected in a classroom with a maximum of 10 students in each session. Participants watched a film lasting approximately 8 min. In that video, a Serbian women spoke about her understanding of what has happened in Srebrenica in 1995. The expression of different emotions or no emotions at all was achieved through (a) writing professional scripts for each condition, (b) hiring a professional actress to enact these specific characters for each condition, and (c) hiring a professional film director to screen the short movies. The actress enacted each condition by verbally expressing the respective emotions but also nonverbally enacting the respective emotional state to increase the authenticity of the character feeling respective emotions. For example, she has adjusted her posture, her voice, and other nonverbal elements of communication depending on emotion condition she enacted. Following this, participants read a statement (aimed at reinforcing the manipulation) indicating that 86% of young people who watched the movie think thought that the person in the film acknowledged her group's responsibility for the genocide committed in Srebrenica but (depending on condition) either feels nothing (No emotion), or feels ashamed for her group's image (image shame), or feels ashamed for belonging to her group (moral shame), or feels guilty for her group's behavior (guilt). They then filled out a questionnaire containing the dependent measures. 1 Manipulation checks. Participants had to answer a question relating to the person's social identity ("to which group do you think the person in movie belongs?") and her level of sincerity (on a 1-7 scale). Participants then answered a series of manipulation check items concerning the emotions felt by the protagonist in the film ("The person in the movie appeared to feel nothing at all"; "The person in the movie is ashamed for who her group is"; "The person in the movie is ashamed because the reputation of her group has been damaged"; "The person in the movie feels guilty for the 1 Only the most relevant of these are reported here. A full list may be obtained from the authors. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
genocide committed by her group"; all on 1-7 scales anchored by not at all and very much). Finally, we also checked that the Serbian protagonist was perceived to have acknowledged responsibility for Serbian crimes committed during the war with the item: "The person in the movie clearly acknowledges her group's responsibility for the genocide committed in Srebrenica." Forgiveness was measured with three items: "I am ready to forgive Serbs everything they have done during the war"; "I could never forgive Serbs crimes they have committed" (reverse coded); and "Bosniaks should never forgive Serbs their misdeeds" (reverse coded). All on a 7-point scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. This scale was reliable, ␣ ϭ .77.
Positive outgroup cognitions. To assess people's beliefs about the Serbian outgroup, a scale of three items was devised: "I think that Serbs are decent"; "I think that Serbs are moral people"; and "I think that Serbs are bad people" (reversed). This scale was reliable, ␣ ϭ .76.
Results
Manipulation checks. Three participants did not categorize the person in the movie as a Serb and as a consequence were excluded from further analyses.
A 4 ϫ 4 repeated measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), with condition as the between-subjects factor and manipulation check item as the repeated measures factor, was used to test whether the protagonist in the film conveyed the intended emotion (see Table 1 ). This yielded three significant effects. There was a main effect for manipulation check, F(3, 105) ϭ 7.53, p Ͻ .001, indicating that some check items were scored higher across Conditions than others (Ms ϭ 4.14, 4.66, 3.59, 3.82). There was also a main effect of condition, F(3, 105) ϭ 3.42, p Ͻ .02, resulting from the fact that participants in some conditions scored higher across all four check items than others (Ms ϭ 3.57, 4.33, 4.06, 4.26). However, of more relevance, the interaction between condition and manipulation check was also significant, F(9, 105) ϭ 16.97, p Ͻ .001, reflecting the fact that, as intended, the manipulation check means differed according to condition (see Table 1 ). As can be seen, the largest mean in each row was for the emotion appropriate to that experimental condition (in bold type), even if that mean was not always reliably different from all others in that row. The no emotion manipulation mean was highest in the no emotion condition and significantly different from the mean levels in the guilt and moral shame conditions (p Ͻ .001). The shame image manipulation check item was highest in the shame image condition and significantly different from the no emotion condition (p Ͻ .001). The guilt manipulation check item was highest in the guilt condition and significantly different from the no emotion and shame image condition (p Ͻ .001). The moral shame manipulation check item was highest in the moral shame condition and significantly different from the no emotion condition (p Ͻ .001).
In summary, the protagonist's emotions were for the most part successfully manipulated. The only real ambiguity concerned the guilt and moral shame conditions, which were not clearly distinguishable.
Willingness to forgive. A one-way between-groups ANOVA revealed a marginally significant main effect of experimental condition on willingness to forgive the outgroup its past misdeeds, F(3, 110) ϭ 2.43, p ϭ .06; the highest level was found in the no emotion condition (M ϭ 3.12, SD ϭ 1.65), which was significantly higher than in image shame (M ϭ 2.04, SD ϭ 1.19, p Ͻ .001, Cohen's d ϭ .75, effect size r ϭ .35) but not than in guilt (M ϭ 2.44, SD ϭ 1.63, p ϭ .40) or moral shame (M ϭ 2.95, SD ϭ 1.96, p ϭ .98). It is worth noting that the mean levels of forgiveness in all four conditions were low, all significantly below the midpoint (4) of the scale (t(29) ϭ 2.92, t(24) ϭ 8.24, t(28) ϭ 5.12, t(29) ϭ 2.94, respectively, all ps Ͻ .001).
Positive cognitions. A similar one-way ANOVA revealed a main effect of condition on positive outgroup cognitions, F(3, 110) ϭ 2.74, p ϭ .04; the highest level was found in the no emotion condition (M ϭ 3.50, SD ϭ 1.22), which was significantly higher than in image shame (M ϭ 2.56, SD ϭ 1.23, p Ͻ .03, Cohen's d ϭ .77, effect size r ϭ .36) but not than in the guilt (M ϭ 3.22, SD ϭ 1.28, p ϭ 82) or moral shame conditions (M ϭ 3.32, SD ϭ 1.34, p ϭ .95). As with forgiveness, the mean levels of positive outgroup cognitions in all four conditions were low, all significantly below the midpoint (4) of the scale (t(29) ϭ 2.24, t(24) ϭ 5.85, t(28) ϭ 3.23, t(29) ϭ 2.77, all ps Ͻ .05).
A contrast comparing the no emotion condition with the other three was created (ϩ3, Ϫ1, Ϫ1, Ϫ1). This contrast yielded a marginally significant effect on Forgiveness, F(1, 112) ϭ 2.99, p ϭ .08, with higher levels of forgiveness in No Emotion (M ϭ 3.12, SD ϭ 1.65) compared with the other conditions (M ϭ 2.50, SD ϭ 1.67, Cohen's d ϭ .37, effect size r ϭ .18). The same contrast was not significant for positive cognitions however, F(1, 112) ϭ 2.53, p ϭ .11, even though the means showed a similar pattern (3.50 vs. 3.06).
Discussion
The results from this study indicate support for H2 over H1. The Serbian protagonist, who acknowledged responsibility for Serbian war crimes but who did not express any emotions, elicited slightly more forgiveness from Bosniak participants than when she expressed emotions-either (image) shame or guilt. It is worth noting that the overall levels of forgiveness were low, indicative of the parlous state of intergroup relations that still exists in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These results for accompanying emotions are consistent with what Wohl and his colleagues (2011) found in a different intergroup context and with different emotions. A nonemotional acknowledgment seems to be a stronger facilitator of 
Study 2
Having established that acknowledgment accompanied with no emotion expressions by a member of the perpetrator group seems to facilitate forgiveness by members of the victim group, the next step was to examine that same issue in the context of apologies. Thus, using the same experimental paradigm as Study 1, we also manipulated whether the protagonist offered an apology for the crimes committed by her group or publicly stated that she saw no reason to apologize.
As noted earlier, the effects of apologies on intergroup forgiveness are unclear (cf. Philpot & Hornsey, 2008; Wohl et al., 2011) . In some of these studies, apologies were accompanied by emotions as well and the evidence currently indicates that adding secondary emotions to an apology tends to have detrimental effects on forgiveness, in line with H2 (Philpot & Hornsey, 2008, Study 4; Wohl et al., 2011, Study 3) . In Study 2, therefore, we extend this work, combining the offer (or refusal) of an apology with four different emotion conditions including the no emotion condition.
Method
Participants. Ninety high school students from Sarajevo (F 66, M 24; mean age, 15.71 years [SD ϭ .94]) participated in a study that employed a 4 ϫ 2 factorial design: emotion (no emotion versus image shame versus guilt versus moral shame) ϫ apology (offered versus refused). Cell sizes varied from eight to 16 participants. Participants were randomly allocated to condition.
Procedure. This was similar to Study 1. After watching the film clip, participants were distributed the same questionnaire as in Study 1. However, this time the questionnaire began with the following text: In the Apology condition, Given the time limitation, we were not in the position to show you the entire movie but only several segments of it. In addition to feeling XXX for her group's behavior in the past, the person in the movie apologizes for what her group has done to Bosniaks during the war. She explicitly stated: "I, as a Serb, apologize for the grave and unjustifiable harm my group has inflicted on Bosniaks during the war. We are all responsible for our actions and therefore I feel obliged to apologies for all the harm we have inflicted upon others in the region and upon Bosniaks in particular."
In the No apology condition, the text read:
Given the time limitation . . . she did not apologize for what her group has done to Bosniaks during the war. She explicitly stated: "I, as a Serb, do not see the need to apologize for the grave and unjustifiable harm my group has inflicted on Bosniaks during the war. Even though we are all responsible for our actions, I do not feel obliged to apologize for all the harm we have inflicted upon others in the region and upon Bosniaks in particular."
Measures. The same battery of measures used in Study 1 was employed here, with the addition of an item to check the Apology manipulation: "The person in the movie has apologized to Bosniaks for what her group has done in the past." The reliabilities for the forgiveness and positive cognitions measures were .74 and .82, respectively.
Results
Manipulation checks. As in Study 1, the first stage of data analysis was to conduct a three-way mixed model ANOVA, emotion ϫ apology ϫ (manipulation) to test the effectiveness of the manipulations (see Table 2 ).
The main effect on manipulation checks was significant, F(3, 82) ϭ 5.91, p Ͻ .001, indicating that the manipulation check means across conditions differed (Ms ϭ 4.45, 4.66, 3.59, 4.09). The emotion main effect was also significant, F(3, 82) ϭ 4.47, p Ͻ .006, because means across manipulation check items also differed (Ms ϭ 3. 62, 4.46, 4.47, 4.25) . The effect of apology was not significant, however (p ϭ .75). Importantly, the interaction between emotion and manipulation checks was significant F(9, 82) ϭ 14.74, p Ͻ .001.
The no emotion item mean was highest in no emotion condition and was significantly different from the means in the other three conditions (p Ͻ .01). Similarly, the image shame item was highest in the image shame condition but not significantly different from the guilt or moral shame conditions. The same patterns were found for the guilt and moral shame check items which were highest in their respective conditions but not significantly different from each other while differing reliably from no emotion.
The apology manipulation was successful. There was a significant main effect of apology on the apology check item, F(1, 82) ϭ 12.65, p Ͻ .001, with the mean in the apology offered condition (M ϭ 5.09, SD ϭ 1.67) being higher than in the apology refused condition (M ϭ 1.54, SD ϭ 1.00). This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Willingness to forgive. A 4 ϫ 2 between-groups ANOVA revealed no significant effect of emotion, F(3, 82) ϭ 2.04, p ϭ .11, or apology, F(1, 82) ϭ .39, p Ͼ .60, and no significant interaction, F(3, 82) ϭ .28, p ϭ .83.
Positive cognitions. As with forgiveness, a two-way ANOVA revealed no significant effect of emotion, F(3, 82) ϭ 2.00, p ϭ .12, or apology, F(1, 82) ϭ .19, p Ͼ .60, and no significant interaction, F(3, 82) ϭ 2.04, p ϭ .12. See Table 3 for means and standard deviations across all conditions.
As in Study 1, we examined the effects of a contrast which compared the No Emotion condition with the other three emotion conditions. This contrast was not significant for forgiveness, F(1, 62) ϭ .09, p ϭ .77 (Ms ϭ 2.90, SD ϭ 1.82; and 2.89, SD ϭ 1.57), but was for positive cognitions, F(1, 62) ϭ 5.10, p ϭ .03 (Ms ϭ 3.33, SD ϭ 1.49; and 2.56, SD ϭ 1.15, Cohen's d ϭ .58, effect size r ϭ .28), indicating significantly higher positive outgroup perceptions in the No Emotion condition compared with the other three.
Discussion
Study 1 found that acknowledgment followed by no emotional expressions elicits more forgiveness in comparison with acknowledgment followed by moral emotions. This study partly confirmed the results of Study 1 by showing that a perpetrator who expresses no emotions tends to elicit more positive outgroup perceptions than someone who expresses emotions. This held true irrespective of whether she offered an apology or not because the one reliable contrast was found collapsing across apology conditions (because there was no main effect of or interaction with apology; the cell sizes in that contrast increased and ranged from 16 -28). The effects of offering an apology were negligible in this study, confirming the results of Philpot and Hornsey (2008) and others (Hornsey & Wohl, 2013) . Even though the data here indicate no significant effect of apology offers, we interpret this result cautiously in view of the relatively low power of the study. We return to this issue in the General Discussion.
Study 3
Having found little evidence of effects of apologies in this postconflict context, the next question to address was whether offering concrete reparations would be any more successful in eliciting forgiveness, and whether this would be moderated by the nature of any accompanying emotion. Accordingly, we adapted the procedure of Study 2 to include a statement from the Serbian protagonist that she supported reparation policies such as rebuilding victims' houses, providing free health care, employment opportunities, and the building of memorials, or that indicated that she saw no need for such reparations.
Method
Participants. Ninety-seven high school students from Sarajevo (F 57, M 40, mean age, 16.40 years [SD ϭ 1.21]) participated in this study. It had a 4 ϫ 2 factorial design to which participants were randomly allocated: Emotion (no emotion versus image shame versus guilt versus moral shame) ϫ reparations (offered versus refused). cell sizes varied from 11 to 13 participants.
Procedure. As in Studies 1 and 2, participants watched a short piece of film and then received a questionnaire containing the Reparations manipulation and the dependent measures. The Reparation manipulation contained either an explicit endorsement of reparation policies to be offered on behalf of her group such as restoration of destructed homes; financial compensation; medical insurance to returnees; and building of a memorial or an explicit refusal of reparation policies which read as follows:
Even though the person expressed feeling an X emotion for her group's behavior in the past, she does not think that Serbs, as her group, are obliged to repair the damage that they have caused (i.e., enabling the return of Bosniak refugees, providing financial compensation for restoration of property and free medical care for returnees and facilitating the employment of Bosniaks).
Measures. The same measures used in Studies 1 and 2 were used, with an additional item to check the Reparation manipulation: "The person in the movie endorses reparation policies to be offered by her group." The reliabilities for the forgiveness and positive cognitions measures were .84 and .66, respectively.
Results
Manipulation checks. A 4 ϫ 2 ϫ (4) ANOVA revealed that the within subjects' effect of manipulation was marginally significant, F(3, 89) ϭ 2.29, p ϭ .07, showing that the manipulation item means across conditions differed (Ms ϭ 4.32, 4.53, 3.93, 4.33) . The effect of emotion was also significant, F(3, 89) ϭ 13.09, p Ͻ .001, indicating that item means across manipulation items differed as well (Ms ϭ 3.32, 4.90, 4.17, 4.72). The effect of reparation was not significant, F(1, 89) ϭ 1.56, p ϭ .22. The crucial interaction between emotion and manipulation was significant, F(9, 89) ϭ 20.61, p Ͻ .001 (see Table 4 ). Note. Bold indicates the highest mean level of perceived emotion in each emotion condition. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
The no emotion check item was highest in the no emotion condition and was significantly different from the other three conditions, p Ͻ .01. Similarly, the image shame item was significantly higher in the image shame condition than in the no emotion and guilt conditions, p Ͻ .001, whereas the comparison with the moral shame condition did not reach significance (p ϭ .41). A similar pattern was found for the guilt check item which was higher in the guilt condition than in the no emotion or image shame conditions, p Ͻ .001, and marginally higher than in the moral shame condition, p ϭ .07. The moral shame check item was significantly different from the no emotion check item, p Ͻ .01, but there were no significant differences with guilt and image shame check items.
The reparation manipulation was also successful. The main effect of reparation on the manipulation check item was significant, F(1, 89) ϭ 6.26, p Ͻ .02, with higher levels in the reparation condition (M ϭ 3.17, SD ϭ 2.05) compared with the no reparation condition (M ϭ 2.30, SD ϭ 1.39).
Forgiveness. A 4 ϫ 2 ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of emotion, F(3, 90) ϭ 3.18, p ϭ .02. Consistent with the results of Studies 1 and 2, participants in the no emotion condition were more likely to forgive (M ϭ 3.69, SD ϭ 2.25) than those in the image shame (M ϭ 2.31, SD ϭ 1.64, p ϭ .007, Cohen's d ϭ .70, effect size r ϭ .33), guilt conditions (M ϭ 2.38, SD ϭ 1.52, p ϭ .011,Cohen's d ϭ .68, effect size r ϭ .32), or moral shame conditions (M ϭ 2.41, SD ϭ 1.65, p Ͻ .01, Cohen's d ϭ .65, effect size r ϭ .31). The latter three conditions did not differ significantly (p ϭ 1.0).
The reparation main effect was not significant, F(1, 90) ϭ .01, p ϭ .94. However, there was a significant emotion ϫ reparation interaction, F(3, 90) ϭ 3.29, p ϭ .02 (see Table 5 and Figure 1 ). We decomposed this interaction by examining the simple effects of emotion within each reparation condition. These revealed that the effect of emotion was not reliable in the reparations condition, F(3, 41) ϭ .16, p ϭ .92, but it was in the no reparations condition, F(3, 49) ϭ 7.56, p Ͻ .001. As can be seen from Figure 1 , in the reparation condition, levels of forgiveness were all approximately equivalent and were all close to 3.0 and significantly different from the midpoint of the scale (4.0; ps Ͻ .05). In contrast, when reparations were not offered, the by-now "usual" pattern of emotional expression was observed: image shame, guilt, and moral shame being significantly lower than no emotion (p Ͻ .02). Note also that all three means in these emotion conditions were low, and reliably lower than the midpoint of the scale, t(13) ϭ 6.65, p Ͻ .001, t(12 ϭ 4.98, p Ͻ .001, t(13) ϭ 3.40, p Ͻ .002).
Positive cognitions. The same 4 ϫ 2 ANOVA was conducted on positive outgroup cognitions. This revealed no reliable main effect of emotion, F(3, 90) ϭ 1.57, p ϭ .20. However, both the main effect of reparation, F(1, 90) ϭ 7.96, p ϭ .006, and the emotion ϫ reparation interaction, F(3, 90) ϭ 2.46, p ϭ .06, were significant or nearly so. Participants in the reparation condition viewed the outgroup more positively (M ϭ 3.89, SD ϭ 1.16) than those in the no reparation condition (M ϭ 3.00, SD ϭ 1.15, Cohen's d ϭ .77, effect size r ϭ .36). This main effect was marginally qualified by the Emotion variable (see Table 5 and Figure 2 ). Decomposing this interaction by examining the simple effects of emotion within each reparation condition revealed a very similar pattern to that observed for forgiveness. Emotion was not significant in reparation, F(3, 41) ϭ .78, p ϭ .51, whereas it was in no reparation, F(3, 49) ϭ 3.54, p Ͻ .02. In reparation, all four emotion conditions elicited equally favorable (i.e., neutral) views of the outgroup levels of forgiveness, not significantly different from the midpoint of the scale (all ps Ͼ .50). When reparations were not forthcoming, as before, the emotion conditions led to less favorable-and clearly negative (i.e., below the midpoint, ps Ͻ 
Discussion
Three points are worth noting about the results of Study 3. First, in the absence of reparations, emotional expression had the same effects as in Studies 1 and 2. A protagonist expressing no overt emotion elicited more forgiveness than someone expressing secondary emotions like (image or moral) shame or guilt. Related to this, it is worth noting that expressions of moral emotion such as guilt and shame, if those are not accompanied with reparation offers, might be potentially "ineffective" for reconciliation processes. Second, offering (or withholding) reparations had a rather different effect from offering (or withholding) apologies (in Study 2). For both dependent measures, when reparations are offered, the accompanying emotions lost their force to influence either forgiveness or positive cognitions. This pattern was quite absent in Study 2 where apologies were manipulated. This difference between reparations and apologies is consistent with the findings from other studies that we noted in the Introduction. Third, and echoing the latter point, it was, in our view, noteworthy that the mean levels of positive cognitions were higher and close to the neutral point of both scales when reparations were on offer. These contrast to the rather lower levels observed for this measure in Studies 1 and 2.
This underlines the tentative conclusion that reparations offered in intergroup contexts are more efficacious for reconciliation than apologies.
Meta-Analysis
Even though the results of our studies provide support to H2 over H1 because nonemotional forms of acknowledgment and reparation offers seem to be more inductive of positive outgroup attitudes in a postconflict context, we acknowledge that our studies have not consistently provided significant results. Therefore, we decided to conduct a meta-analysis of the three studies above. We compared the no emotion versus the other three conditions contrast across Studies 1-3, based on z scores. A weighted integration of the three effects, using the df of each effect as weights, yielded a significant combined effect both for forgiveness, z ϭ 2.89, p Ͻ .003, and positive outgroup cognitions, z ϭ 3.29, p Ͻ .004. This convergence of findings across all three studies lends further confirmation to our results. as a 'buffer' against the negative effect of expressing selfconscious emotions. The specific contribution of these studies lies in the examination of separate effects of apology, reparation, and emotion expressions, as these have often been confounded in the existing literature, potentially leading to misleading interpretations. The investigation of the effects of apology, reparation, and emotion expressions on intergroup forgiveness and positive cognitions is an important but yet underinvestigated indicator of intergroup reconciliation.
To these results we would make the following additional comments. First, the evidence that a perpetrator group member expressing emotions seems to be counterproductive for eliciting a positive response (measured through forgiveness and positive outgroup perceptions) from the victim group was consistent with the explanation advanced by Wohl et al. (2012) . Wohl and his colleagues proposed the "dehumanization hypothesis," suggesting that victim group members are motivated to maintain a dehumanized perception of the perpetrator groups and consequently seem to be unwilling to accept any emotional reaction as offered by perpetrator groups. Our results indeed support the finding of "unwelcome" emotional reactions. However, the exact process as to why still remains to be empirically tested. On the other hand, and as noted in the introduction, the seminal moment of Willy Brandt kneeling at the Warsaw ghetto in 1970, although wordless, was hardly emotionless. To many observers, his behavioral posture was clearly expressive of shame and guilt on behalf of the German people. In other words, victim group members might not be very receptive to explicitly stated emotions but might rather prefer an emotionally based action. Even though the results of this research point to positive implication of acknowledgment expressed in a nonemotional manner, it should not be concluded that feeling moral emotions by perpetrator groups are not conducive to reconciliation as research has shown that feelings of guilt, for example, can motivate reparation endorsement (e.g., Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998) .
Second, the null effects of apologies on forgiveness are in line with other evidence in the intergroup domain . Perpetrator apologies seem to be insufficient by themselves to facilitate forgiveness by victim group members. That said, it is of interest to ask why then some victim groups campaign so vigorously for such apologies (Nobles, 2008) . There would seem to be at least two reasons. One is that such campaigns can provide a focus for the political mobilization of groups who have been the victims of historical injustice. By seeking and obtaining an apology, such groups may acquire an important public acknowledgment of their plight. However, in addition, many victim groups may feel that those apologies are but a first step in their search for justice and some genuine repair of the historical harm that they have suffered (Wohl, Hornsey, & Philpot, 2011) . It is also worth noting that there may be some contexts where perpetrator group apologies may elicit forgiveness, especially where sufficient trust between the parties exists (Hornsey & Wohl, 2013) . The fact that BiH is far from being such a context (Č ehajić et al., 2008) and that in addition offers of public and political apologies are viewed as a reciprocal dyad may help to explain why apologies were so ineffectual in the experiments reported here.
Third, our studies were based in a still fraught real-life intergroup context and used realistic filmed materials to effect the experimental manipulations. Moreover, the participants, all members of one of the groups involved in the conflict, clearly had a psychological "stake" in the issues we were studying. All these features lent important mundane realism and hence external validity to the experiments. However, as is often the case, such mundane realism was bought partly at the expense of precise experimental control. The film clips in which the Serb protagonist appeared, although carefully scripted, inevitably contained some minor uncontrolled variations in length, emotional expression, and voice tone in the interests of preserving authenticity. As was apparent from the manipulation checks, although each emotion condition mostly had the highest score on the relevant emotion check item, there was not always a perfect separation between the conditions (Tables 1-3 ). Moreover, Studies 2 and 3 were also underpowered to accommodate their two factor designs. This was attributable to the difficulty in finding schools willing to collaborate on what is still a sensitive research topic in BiH. We have addressed this issue by creating and testing the differences between two contrasts (no emotion versus emotion expressions) and conducting a meta-analysis on the results from our three studies. Despite the limitation of our sample sizes, the findings that the experiments yielded are consistent, especially with regard to the effects of expressing emotions while also acknowledging illegitimate ingroup actions by an ingroup member. It is also worth noting that the lack of statistical power is most relevant to any failure to observe reliable effects (e.g., owing to apology or to the possibly subtle effects of the three different emotions); it does not really undermine the consistent significant effects (e.g., due to No emotion vs. the three other emotions combined).
